Research

My research agenda, broadly speaking, is centered around the areas of public opinion, political psychology, and political behavior. Much of my research is grounded in questions of how individuals’ various group identities influence their political views. While I am interested in multiple aspects of identity, my research tends to focus on racial and partisan identities. I integrate public and original survey data, frequentist and Bayesian linear methods, and survey experiments to interrogate the deep connections between race, partisanship, and attitudes about political institutions such as parties and elections.

Dissertation

The Racial Undercurrents of Affective Partisan Polarization

My dissertation argues that group conflicts about race in American politics fuel what we often think of as a problem of partisans not getting along. This research argues that affective polarization, while often conceptually divorced from race, is driven and conditional on individual voters’ racial identities and views. I argue that partisan polarization is closely connected to individual-level perceptions of racial discrimination and threat towards one’s group. I theorize that an individual’s racial identity and whether they perceive a status threat to their racial group influences their degree of polarization, though this relationship is conditional on how an individual relates to their party’s messaging on racial grievances. Using survey and experimental data, I find evidence that increases in feelings of racial discrimination can exacerbate partisan extremity. I also use quantitative text analysis on open-ended survey data to uncover key distinctions in how white and Latino partisans conceptualize the parties as a way of demonstrating that some voters within these two groups of voters do perceive an active racial status threat from the opposing party. This data also helps with better explaining differences in macro-level partisan sentiment between white and Latino partisans.

My research expands our understanding of partisan polarization by demonstrating that while partisan polarization might feel like a new problem, many aspects of it are intertwined with and fueled by the longer-standing racial conflicts that have long been a defining feature of American politics. While much of the current research focused on addressing partisan polarization is concerned with correcting partisan misperceptions, my dissertation suggests that another route for addressing polarization is through more directly addressing racial conflict and inequities in the U.S. However, doing so will require seriously considering differences in how the parties message on race and thinking about the varied motivations of who becomes emboldened in their partisan extremity in the political struggle for multiracial democracy.

Working Papers

Group-Based Status Threat’s Relationship with Affective Polarization

Why do some partisans exhibit more partisan animosity than others? I argue that chronic group-based status threat in the form of perceived racial discrimination conditions partisan affect, producing divergent patterns across partisan-racial subgroups. Using Bayesian multilevel modeling across four studies (pooled N = 17,084) to improve statistical precision for partisan-racial subgroups, I find that perceptions of racial discrimination are positively associated with partisan animosity among Latino Democrats and white Republicans but negatively associated among Latino Republicans and white Democrats. This cross-cutting pattern suggests that status threat operates relationally: affective polarization is highest when perceived discrimination aligns with patterns of partisan social sorting and lowest when it conflicts. These findings demonstrate that perceptions of group-based marginalization are a systematic, heterogeneous source of affective polarization, and that partisan affect cannot be understood apart from the group-based status hierarchies which structure American politics.

Who Trusts the Counts? American Election Confidence Across Race and Ethnicity

Trust in elections is critical to democratic legitimacy, and it has long been known that nonwhite voters are less trusting in U.S. elections. Despite this persistent finding, the racial gap in voter confidence has been understudied. Little is known about how trust in elections is distributed across Asian American, Black, and Latino voters. It is also not clear whether these differences between white and nonwhite voters are a byproduct of race on its own or due to other compositional differences. To test these questions, we use a Bayesian multilevel model approach applied to observational data from the 2024 Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election Survey (CMPS), as the unique oversamples of nonwhite voters allow us to independently model the voter confidence of Asian American, Black, Latino, and white voters. In doing so, we uncover a consistent internal structure of the racial gap in voter confidence: low voter confidence is concentrated among Black and Latino voters while Asian American voters are closer to white voters, who are generally highest in trust. We then further disaggregate our results across a variety of other demographic and attitudinal measures to elicit whether the gap is due to race or these other factors. We find across variety of tests that this internal racial structure is persistent even in the face of further disaggregation. We conclude that, in combination with different underlying distributions of characteristics such as age, partisanship, and education, the racial gap in voter confidence is driven to some degree by race on its own. Our research has important implications for bolstering confidence in American elections, especially among historically marginalized groups of voters.

The Demobilizing Effect of Primary Electoral Institutions on Voters of Color

Are electoral institutions – such as closed primaries – associated with reduced levels of participation by people of color? We theorize and find that primary electoral institutions that bar independent voters from participating in first-round elections mechanically reduce participation in primary elections; and also reduce turnout among registered independents in second-round general elections. Closed primaries have large demobilizing impacts on Asian American and Latinx voters, as these voters are registered as independents at higher rates than whites. We examine nationally representative and validated survey data from 2012 to 2018. Open and top-two primaries are associated with higher turnout from independent voters of color in both primary and general elections. Implications are that party registration status and formal institutions differentially demobilize voters of color and whites.